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Abstract: 
We applaud Richardson, Mulvey, and Killen’s [2012] application of the hierarchical competing 
systems model (HCSM) to models of social decision making. The HCSM is a framework of the 
development of executive function that was formulated to account for patterns of behavior in 
infant and toddler search tasks. However, the principles of the model are relevant across a wide 
range of domains throughout the lifespan [Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009]. According to the HCSM 
framework, behavior (or decision making) results from the joint contributions of a habit system 
(appropriately relabeled ‘experience’ by Richardson et al.) and a representational system. In turn, 
the act of reflection – defined as representing a representation – strengthens the influence of the 
representational system to the point where it can override the influence of the habit system. 
Importantly, reflection is not always needed for an individual to act in a novel, appropriate 
fashion (i.e., this can occur through the influences of unreflective representations). That said, the 
presence of reflection allows for the modification of behavior (or preexisting rationales for 
decision making) based solely on endogenous processes, even when these endogenous processes 
can be triggered from environmental events. In short, we argue that unexpected changes in the 
environment have the potential to initiate reflection, provided that the individual is attentive, 
capable of processing the nature of the disturbance, and motivated to reconcile the situation. 
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Richardson et al. [2012] applied the HCSM successfully to the social domain theory by 
illustrating convincingly that in contexts in which children are attentive and capable, reflection 
can be elicited from unexpected environmental cues in an effort to override prepotent modes of 
response. It is through this mechanism that moral judgment develops and more sophisticated 
lines of moral reasoning can replace immature ones that were established previously. This 
application is entirely consistent with the intended purpose of the HCSM framework, and the 
integration of the two theories has the potential to set the stage for refinement of social judgment 
theories that lack cognitive mechanisms that account for development and cognitive 
developmental theories that do not account for the social context of the individual.  
One challenge in studying social judgments from a habit/experience perspective is to identify the 
default assumptions that children bring to bear on specific social judgments or decisions; in some 
cases, these assumptions are evident, but they can also be quite elusive and are likely to be 
context-dependent. Identifying the underlying assumptions, and documenting how these 
assumptions are likely to change both with age and experience, will enable us to understand what 
is prototypic. Indeed, it is the counter-examples to these prototypes that may determine 
conditions under which children are expected to invoke the representational system. 
We have conducted research on the nature and emergence of young children’s global personality 
judgments (e.g., How do young children decide that a person is ‘nice’ as opposed to ‘mean’?). 
One of the major factors that guide such social decisions is behavioral frequency (i.e., number of 
trait-relevant behavioral exemplars). Research indicates that, at a very early age, children are 
sensitive to frequency information and use it to learn about the physical and social world. For 
example, frequency detection is considered to be a major mechanism implicated in infants’ 
ability to predict future actions [Paulus et al., 2011]. It is also clear that preschoolers rely on 
frequency to make personality judgments. For example, children are more likely to generate a 
relevant trait attribution about a person after receiving several behavioral exemplars compared to 
only one behavioral exemplar [Boseovski & Lee, 2006, exp. 2]. On some accounts, the 
expectations that are formed based on this type of statistical evidence are used by ‘default’ and 
do not necessarily involve reflection [Paulus et al., 2011]. Thus, the use of frequency information 
can be described as habit-based. Of course, personality judgments are not based on frequency 
information alone. Consistent with Richardson et al.’s [2012] discussion of moral judgments, 
intentionality information is also critical to personality judgments [Malle, 2004]. Although there 
is ample evidence to suggest strong intention understanding in infancy [e.g., Sommerville, 
Woodward, & Needham, 2005], one challenge for older children is to integrate intention 
information with behavioral frequency information when making personality judgments. This 
ability is nascent and requires reflection, particularly when the two cues are at odds (e.g., high 
frequency behavior that on its own implies a particular trait, but that is accidental rather than 
intentional).  
An additional challenge for young children’s personality reasoning concerns biased processing 
of information irrespective of cues such as frequency and intention. By middle childhood, 
children exhibit a default positivity bias wherein they give greater weight to positive than 
negative information when making personality judgments about others; this is thought to be 
socially mediated [Boseovski, 2010]. For example, children disregard negative information in 
their judgments about other people [Boseovski & Lee, 2008] and expect positive behavior when 
given neutral or negative intention information [Boseovski, Chiu, & Marcovitch, 2012; Grant & 
Mills, 2011].  
Consistent with Richardson et al. [2012], we interpret this positivity bias to be an instance of an 
experience-based assumption that will guide the decision making of young children unless they 
are able to invoke the appropriate reflection to override these tendencies. For example, 
Boseovski and Lee [2006, exp. 2] found that children needed to observe 5 negative behavioral 
exemplars before they were likely to make a judgment of ‘mean’, whereas they only needed to 
witness one positive exemplar before attributing niceness to a character. Using the joint 
framework suggested by Richardson et al., we would argue that children expect characters to 
behave nicely to one another. The expectation is sufficiently strong in that it takes 5 violations of 
this expectation before children are forced to reflect upon the situation and modify their 
judgments accordingly.  
Like the authors, we also take the view that the representational system is strengthened by 
maturation and individual differences in EF (e.g., working memory, inhibitory control). For 
example, children’s personality reasoning degrades substantially in situations in which they have 
to monitor the behavior of a protagonist toward several different recipients rather than only one 
recipient over time [Boseovski & Lee, 2006, exp. 1]. Preliminary evidence from our laboratory 
also reveals that children’s performance on measures of working memory and goal maintenance 
are related directly to the likelihood of overriding their default positive social judgments. In 
addition, in a paradigm in which young children were asked to choose between the negatively 
valenced testimony of an expert informant as compared to the positively valenced testimony of a 
novice informant concerning the characteristics of a novel animal, a significant positive 
correlation emerged between parent-reported inhibitory control and selection of the negative 
expert informant over the positive novice informant. Accordingly, we agree with the authors that 
executive functioning skills must be studied within the context of social judgments and decision 
making.  
In sum, we regard the integrative perspective of Richardson et al. [2012] to be a critical step 
toward understanding children’s social decision making. As research from our labs and others 
continues to accumulate, greater specifications of the proposed process model will enable us to 
uncover the complexities involved in the development of social and moral reasoning.  
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